| 摘要: |
| 在习惯国际法框架下，当股东直接权利受损时，股东可以以自己名义提出索赔请求，
但股东股份价值的减少只能通过外交保护等间接方式得到救济。然而在现代国际投资
仲裁体制中，仲裁庭实质上允许了股东直接提出利益损失的仲裁申请。由于现代投资
条约缺乏相应的制度构建，使得仲裁庭允许股东直接提出间接索赔的行为引发了相应
的风险，侵犯了公司债权人以及相关当事方的权利。为此，有必要借鉴习惯国际法与
NAFTA的相关规定，对国际投资条约进行修正。 |
| 关键词: 巴塞罗那案 国际投资仲裁 股东保护 |
| DOI： |
|
| 基金项目: |
|
| The Protection of Shareholders in International Investment Arbitration |
| ZHANG Xiao-tao |
|
| Abstract: |
| In the framework of customary international law, shareholders can claim in its own name when its
direct rights was infringed, however, for the loss of value of shareholding in company, shareholder can only be
remedied by an indirect way of diplomatic protection. By contrast, in the context of modern international investment
arbitration, the arbitral tribunals essentially allow claims by shareholders directly for those reflective loss, due to the
lack of corresponding mechanisms in modern investment treaties, the behaviors of arbitral tribunals have attracted
many risks, violating the company's creditors and related rights of the interested parties, it is therefore necessary
to draw on customary international law and relevant provisions of NAFTA to amend the international investment
treaties. |
| Key words: Barcelona case international investment arbitration protection of shareholders |
